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A DEVICE DESIGNED TO MANIPULATE DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION: WHY COURTS SHOULD REFUSE TO
RECOGNIZE POST-REMOVAL DAMAGE
STIPULATIONS
BENJAMIN T. CLARK*
I. Introduction
Many federal courts allow plaintiffs to destroy diversity jurisdiction with
post-removal damage stipulations.1  As the name indicates, these stipulations
state that the plaintiff’s damages are below the federal jurisdictional amount,
and are filed after a case has been removed from state to federal court.2
Although courts have extensively discussed post-removal damage stipulations,
legal commentators have largely ignored them.3
This article aims to fill that void.  Specifically, it (1) explains that federal
courts have inconsistently treated post-removal damage stipulations; (2) argues
that recognition of post-removal damage stipulations flouts U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, congressional intent, and is bad policy; and (3) proposes
several solutions to ensure that post-removal stipulations are banished from the
amount in controversy analysis.
To understand how post-removal damage stipulations impact federal court
jurisdiction, Part II of this article provides background information on the
topics of diversity jurisdiction, removal, and remand.  It also explains that state
law often prevents a plaintiff from pleading a specific dollar amount of
damages in her complaint.  Consequently, the amount in controversy is often
unclear.  Part III analyzes case law addressing post-removal damage
stipulations, which is inconsistent and confusing.  Part IV explains why this
inconsistent treatment is troubling, and why courts should not recognize post-
removal damage stipulations.  Finally, Part V offers possible solutions toward
securing a more legally sound and consistent approach.
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4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; In re NASDAQ Mkt. Makers Antitrust Litig., 929 F. Supp.
174, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (stating that “federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction”).
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) (providing that the “district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States”).  Federal question jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this article.  Generally, it is
triggered when a “well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause
of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial
question of federal law.”  Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463
U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).
6. See Baker v. City of Dallas, No. 3-02-CV-1378-G, 2002 WL 31016531, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 6, 2002) (“Plaintiff allege[d] that defendant negligently maintained a city sidewalk,
causing her to trip and fall.  Such a claim arises solely under state law.  Thus, the only basis for
federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship.”).
7. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 119,
120 (2003) (stating that “[t]he continued necessity of diversity jurisdiction has been hotly
debated on many occasions, generating extensive commentary in the legal literature”).
8. Compare Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (stressing the “mounting mischief inflicted on the federal judicial system by the
unjustifiable continuance of diversity jurisdiction”), with 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601 (2d
ed. 1984 & Supp. 2005) (stating that there is some “merit” to the argument that “federal courts
qualitatively are so superior to state courts that it is desirable to channel as many cases as
possible to federal courts, or at least that out-of-state litigants who have no opportunity to work
for the improvement of the state courts, should be spared exposure to them”).  The repeated
calls for abolition of diversity jurisdiction have apparently fallen on deaf ears.  “Despite
trenchant criticism . . . Congress has declined to place significant limitations on the statutory
diversity grant.”  DiRuggiero v. Rodgers, 743 F.2d 1009, 1018 (3d Cir. 1984) (footnote
omitted).
9. Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 352 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that one
II. The Applicable Law
In contrast to state courts, federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction
and may exercise jurisdiction over a case only if they have original jurisdiction
over the case.4  Original jurisdiction is usually triggered by either federal
question or diversity jurisdiction.  Federal question jurisdiction exists when the
plaintiff’s cause of action arises under federal law.5  In contrast, diversity
jurisdiction may exist where the plaintiff’s cause of action arises solely under
state law.6  The purpose of diversity jurisdiction, and how to invoke it, is
discussed below.
A. Diversity Jurisdiction
The wisdom of diversity jurisdiction has been extensively discussed,7 and
this article does not delve into that debate.8  It is sufficient to say that the most
cited justification for diversity jurisdiction is to protect out-of-state defendants
from local bias and prejudice.9  As one court explained,
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rationale underlying diversity jurisdiction is to “allow defendants to flee the state courts”);
Rooney v. Tyson, 127 F.3d 295, 297 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that “the object of diversity
jurisdiction [is to present] the actual parties to a litigation with a neutral, federal, playing field”);
Ho v. Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 2d 1163, 1164 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (stating that the
“primary purpose of the diversity statute is to avoid prejudice against ‘outsiders’”).
10. Ho, 143 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (2000) (providing in part that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.”); see
also Brooks v. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1300 (M.D. Ala. 2001)
(stating that “[f]ederal courts may exercise jurisdiction in cases involving citizens of different
states only if the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs”).
12. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 268 (1806).
13. Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Montle, 964 F.2d 48, 49 (1st Cir. 1992).
14. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3612.  For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a
corporation is considered a citizen of: (1) any state in which it is incorporated, and (2) the state
where its principal place of business is located.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
15. Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1986).  This list is not exhaustive, and the
domicile determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.  Delgado Ortiz v. Irelan, 830 F.
Supp. 68, 70 (D.P.R. 1993).
16. Palermo v. Abrams, 62 F. Supp. 2d 408, 410 (D.P.R. 1999).
The Congress that provided for diversity jurisdiction was
concerned that a local jury sitting in state court might exhibit bias
in favor of a ‘local’ party who was suing an out-of-state party.
Because federal courts draw from a wider jury pool, [diversity
jurisdiction], so the theory goes, provides a more neutral forum.10
To trigger diversity jurisdiction, the party invoking it must satisfy two
requirements: (1) there must be complete diversity of citizenship between the
plaintiff and the defendant, and (2) the amount in controversy must exceed
$75,000 exclusive of interest and costs.11  Complete diversity requires that the
opposing parties be citizens of different states.12  A person is a citizen of the
state where she is domiciled,13 which “is the place where [s]he has [her] true,
fixed home and principal establishment, and to which, whenever [s]he is
absent, [s]he has the intention of returning.”14
To determine a person’s domicile, courts consider several factors, including:
the location of the person’s real and personal property, the state issuing the
person’s driver’s license, the state where the person’s bank accounts are
maintained, club or church membership, and the person’s place of
employment.15  Domicile is determined as of the date the lawsuit is filed.16  If
the parties are completely diverse, the next step is to determine whether the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
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17. Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1997).
18. An ad damnum clause is the portion of a complaint where the plaintiff demands a
specific amount of monetary damages from the defendant.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 38 (7th
ed. 1999).
19. Singer, 116 F.3d at 375; see also Chase v. Shop ’N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110
F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating that “[t]he starting point in determining the amount in
controversy is typically the face of the complaint, where the plaintiff indicates the claim’s value
in her request for relief”).
20. Singer, 116 F.3d at 375.
21. Homolka v. Hartford Ins. Group, 953 F. Supp. 350, 351 (N.D. Okla. 1995).  Courts
have imposed three different burdens of proof on defendants attempting to establish the
jurisdictional minimum.  “First, the ‘reverse legal certainty’ standard requires a defendant to
show that it is not a legal certainty that the plaintiff would recover less than the jurisdictional
amount.”  Russell D. Jessee, Pleading to Stay in State Court: Forum Control, Federal Removal
Jurisdiction, and the Amount in Controversy Requirement, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 651, 652-
53 (1999).  Second, “the ‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard . . . require[s] a defendant
to prove the jurisdictional amount [is satisfied] by a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. at 653.
Finally, “the ‘legal certainty’ standard forces a defendant to prove to a legal certainty that a
prevailing plaintiff cannot recover less than the jurisdictional amount.”  Id.
22. Alice M. Noble-Allgire, Removal of Diversity Actions When the Amount in Controversy
Cannot Be Determined from the Face of Plaintiff’s Complaint: The Need for Judicial and
Statutory Reform to Preserve Defendant’s Equal Access to Federal Courts, 62 MO. L. REV. 681,
687-89 nn.12-13 (1997) (citing numerous state statutes and rules of civil procedure, including
COLO. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (providing that “‘[n]o dollar amount shall be stated in the prayer . . . for
relief’”) (alteration in original)); IND. R. TRIAL P. 8(a) (providing that “in any complaint seeking
damages for personal injury or death, or seeking punitive damages, no dollar amount or figure
shall be included in the demand”); WIS. STAT. § 802.02(1m) (1996) (providing that “[w]ith
respect to a tort claim seeking the recovery of money, the demand for judgment may not specify
the amount of money the pleader seeks”) (alteration in original); MICH. R. CIV. P. 2.111(B)
(providing that “[i]f the pleader seeks an award of money, a specific amount must be stated if
the claim is for a sum certain or a sum that can by computation be made certain, or if the
amount sought is $10,000 or less.  Otherwise, a specific amount may not be stated, and the
Courts generally apply a “mechanical test” to gauge whether the
jurisdictional minimum is satisfied.17  First, the district court will simply read
the ad damnum18 clause of the complaint.19  If the claim for damages appears
to be made “in good faith,” then the sum the plaintiff claimed controls, unless
“it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot recover the amount
claimed.”20
If, however, the complaint does not specify the amount of damages sought,
then the party seeking the federal forum bears the burden of proving that the
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.21  This situation is not uncommon, as
many states have “rules expressly prohibiting plaintiffs from requesting a
specific monetary sum in their prayer for relief or, in a slight variation of this
rule, permitting the plaintiff to plead only that the amount in controversy
exceeds a minimum amount.”22
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pleading must include allegations that show that the claim is within the jurisdiction of the
court”); NEV. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (providing that “[w]here a claimant seeks damages of more than
$10,000, the demand shall be for damages ‘in excess of $10,000’ without further specification
of amount”)).
23. Id. at 689 (quoting a statement by Illinois Senator Glass explaining that Illinois
“eliminate[d] ad damnum provisions so that someone suing a doctor or hospital does not state
the total amount of the claim and thereby eliminate[] some adverse publicity for doctors who
are inadvertently sued for large amounts of money and, in fact, later settle for . . . much less or
are found not [liable]” (emphasis added)).
24. Bechard v. Eisinger, 105 A.D.2d 939, 941 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984); see also Sullivan v.
Birmingham, 416 N.E.2d 528, 531 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981) (stating that the Massachusetts
Legislature “has prohibited the inclusion of an ad damnum amount in a medical malpractice
complaint because a specific request could improperly affect the amount of damages ultimately
awarded by a jury on the claim” (emphasis added)).
25. 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 8, § 3725 (citation omitted).
26. McCorkindale v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 909 F. Supp. 646, 655 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
27. Scott R. Haliber, Removing the Bias Against Removal, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 609, 617
(2004).
Several rationales support these state rules.  One rationale is that the rules
were “adopted as a means of protecting defendants from the publicity
generated by multi-million dollar claims for damages.”23  Another is that the
rules are designed “to curb the effect of exaggerated demands for damages
which could be read to the jury and thereby bias them towards making
excessive awards.”24
Regardless of the motive, an undesirable consequence has been confusion
in determining the amount in controversy.  As one leading treatise recognized:
[W]hen the state in which the federal court is sitting either does not
require that the complaint contain a demand for a specific monetary
amount, expressly forbids the inclusion of such a demand in the
prayer for relief, or requires only that more than a certain threshold
state court jurisdictional amount be alleged[, it is not surprising] the
federal courts have had some difficulties in measuring the amount
in controversy.25
Thus, when ad damnum clauses are prohibited or limited, “the allegations of
actual damages on the face of the complaint provide the court with no basis for
determining the amount of actual damages in question.”26
B. Removing a Case from State to Federal Court
As explained above, the primary purpose behind diversity jurisdiction is to
protect out-of-state defendants from local prejudice.  Of course, “federal courts
cannot meaningfully protect against local prejudice if a plaintiff simply can
avoid a federal forum by filing his lawsuit in state court.”27  “In other words,
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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28. Id.
29. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000).
31. Smith v. Union Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 187 F. Supp. 2d 635, 638 (S.D. Miss. 2001)
(recognizing that the “federal removal statute permits a defendant in a state court action to
remove the lawsuit to federal district court if federal subject matter jurisdiction existed when
the complaint was initially filed”).
32. The notice of removal must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for
removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon [the] defendant
or defendants.”  28 U.S.C. § 1446(a).  The notice must be filed either: (1) within thirty days of
receipt of the complaint or summons, whichever period is shorter; or (2) within thirty days of
receiving “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which [removability] may
first be ascertained.”  28 U.S.C. § 1146(b); see also Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392 F.3d
195, 201 (6th Cir. 2004) (outlining the process for removing a case from state to federal court).
In all cases, an action may not be removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction more than one
year after the commencement of the action.  28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
33. 303 U.S. 283 (1938).
34. Id. at 289-90 (stating that “[e]vents occurring subsequent to the institution of suit which
reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction”).  With respect
to the amount in controversy requirement, the importance of St. Paul Mercury cannot be
overstated.  As one court recognized, “[e]very comprehensive discussion concerning the amount
in controversy should begin with St. Paul Mercury . . . .”  Threet v. Bowers, No. 1:04 CV 103-
D-D, 2004 WL 2526399, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Oct. 4, 2004).
35. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 289-90; Chase v. Shop ’N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc.,
from a defendant’s perspective, the theoretical existence of diversity
jurisdiction is meaningless unless a procedural mechanism allows a defendant
to invoke it[] . . . .”28  Recognizing this need, Congress enacted the federal
removal statute.29  
The removal statute provides in part that
any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts
of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United
States for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending.30
Therefore, if the requirements for diversity jurisdiction are satisfied, the
defendant may remove a case from state to federal court.31  This is
accomplished by filing a notice of removal with the federal court.32
In the seminal case of St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co.,33 the
Supreme Court ruled that district courts must determine whether federal
jurisdiction exists with reference to the moment a case is removed, without
referring to subsequent events.34  Therefore, the federal court must only
examine those facts that existed at the moment the petition for removal was
filed.35  In St. Paul Mercury, the plaintiff filed suit in state court and sought
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss2/3
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110 F.3d 424, 427 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809,
814 (8th Cir. 1969) (stating that “the situation at the time of removal . . . is determinative”).
36. St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 285-86.
37. Id. at 285.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 295-96.
41. Id. at 289-90.
42. Id. at 294.
43. Id. at 292.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000).
damages in the amount of $4000, at a time when the jurisdictional minimum
was $3000.36  The defendants removed the case on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction, and the plaintiff responded by amending its complaint.37  The
amended complaint repeated the same allegations as the original complaint and
again sought damages of $4000.38  Attached to the amended complaint,
however, was an exhibit explaining that the plaintiff’s damages only totaled
$1,380.84.39  The district court refused to remand the case, and the Supreme
Court affirmed.40
In St. Paul Mercury, the Court held that “[e]vents occurring subsequent to
the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable below the statutory
limit do not oust jurisdiction.”41  A contrary rule would allow the plaintiff to
simply reduce the amount of her claim to defeat federal jurisdiction, making
the 
defendant’s supposed statutory right of removal . . . subject to the
plaintiff’s caprice.  The claim, whether well or ill-founded in fact,
fixes the right of the defendant to remove, and the plaintiff ought
not to be able to defeat that right and bring the cause back to the
state court at his election.  If he does not desire to try his case in the
federal court he may resort to the expedient of suing for less than
the jurisdictional amount, and though he would be justly entitled to
more, the defendant cannot remove.42
Therefore, when the “plaintiff after removal, by stipulation, by affidavit, or by
amendment of his pleadings, reduces the claim below the requisite amount,
this does not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.”43
C. Remanding a Case Back to State Court
As indicated above, Congress also enacted a mechanism to ensure that cases
improperly removed would be sent back to state court.  Under 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c), “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”44  The removal
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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45. Doe v. Allied Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993).
46. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994); Smith
v. Union Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 187 F. Supp. 2d 635, 638 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (stating that a district
court “‘may retain jurisdiction only where its authority to do so is clear’” (quoting Gorman v.
Abbott Labs., 629 F. Supp. 1196, 1203 (D.R.I. 1986)).  Additionally, although beyond the scope
of this article, there are many procedural hurdles to removing a case.  See Haliber, supra note
27, at 609 (arguing that “[c]oupling supposed statutory ambiguities with judicial presumptions
favoring remand to state court, federal courts littered the removal landscape with a daunting
array of procedural landmines for the litigator to navigate”).
47. Villano v. Kohl’s Dep’t Stores, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 2d 418, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
48. In re Bus. Men’s Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 182 (8th Cir. 1993); see also
Schexnayder v. Entergy La., Inc., 394 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that “Congress has
severely circumscribed the power of federal appellate courts to review remand orders”).  Section
1447(d) provides in part that “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was
removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.”  28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
49. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711-12 (1996).  Section 1447(c) allows
remand if the “district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.”  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
50. Schexnayder, 394 F.3d at 283.
51. 423 U.S. 336 (1976), abrogated by Quackenbush, 517 U.S. 706.
52. Id. at 340.
53. Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
54. Id. at 340-41 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 341.
statute is strictly construed,45 and if federal jurisdiction is doubtful, the case
must be remanded to state court.46  Courts justify this strict construction under
the guise of comity and “the deference courts generally give to a plaintiff’s
choice of forum.”47
As a general rule, a district court’s decision to remand a case is immunized
from appellate review.48  The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a remand
order may be reviewed on appeal only if the district court ordered a remand for
reasons other than those authorized by § 1447(c).49  More specifically,
appellate review is proper if the district court based its decision to remand on
something other than a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in
removal procedures.50
For example, in Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer,51 the district
court concluded that the defendants had a right to remove the case based on
federal diversity jurisdiction.52  The court then ruled that the right to remove,
however, must be “balanced against the plaintiffs’ right to a forum of their
choice and their right to a speedy decision on the merits of their cause of
action.”53  Because of the district court’s crowded docket, the “‘plaintiffs’ right
of redress [was] being severely impaired,’ which ‘would not be the case if the
cause had not been removed from the state courts.’”54  For these reasons, the
district court remanded the case back to state court.55  The U.S. Court of
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss2/3
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56. Id. at 341-42.
57. As indicated above, those grounds are that the removal procedures were not properly
followed and that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  See supra note 49.
58. Thermtron Prods., 423 U.S. at 351.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. No. 100CV63-D-D, 2000 WL 679107 (N.D. Miss. May 4, 2000).
62. Id. at *1.
63. Id.
64. Id.  The defendants also asserted federal question jurisdiction, although the court did
not address that basis for jurisdiction.  Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000)).  The court also cited the well-settled rule that
once a motion to remand has been filed, the removing party bears the burden of establishing that
federal jurisdiction exists.  Id.
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the
remand order, and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.56
In Thermtron Products, the Court recognized that “Congress immunized
from all forms of appellate review any remand order issued on the grounds
specified in § 1447(c),57 whether or not that order might be deemed erroneous
by an appellate court.”58  Importantly, however, the fact that “justice may
move more slowly in some federal courts than in their state counterparts is not
one of the considerations that Congress has permitted the district courts to
recognize in passing on remand issues.”59  Accordingly, the Court held that the
district court should not have remanded the case.60
D. Application of Diversity Jurisdiction, Removal, and Remand
The removal process and a federal court’s consideration of diversity
jurisdiction is better understood through illustration.  The facts in Yarbrough
v. Household Retail Services61 are straightforward and tie together the concepts
of diversity jurisdiction, removal, and remand.  The Yarbrough court described
the facts as follows:  “The [p]laintiffs in this action are four individuals who
allege that the [d]efendants engaged in tortious conduct in the selling of home
satellite systems.”62  The plaintiffs filed their complaint in state court; namely,
the Circuit Court of Monroe County, Mississippi.63  The defendants removed
the case to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi,
asserting diversity jurisdiction as the basis for removal.64  In response, the
plaintiffs filed a motion to remand, arguing that diversity of citizenship was
lacking and that their claims were for less than the jurisdictional minimum.65
The court began its analysis by noting that federal diversity jurisdiction
exists when the action is between citizens of different states and the amount
in controversy exceeds $75,000.66  “At the time [the] action was commenced,
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2005
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67. Id.
68. Id.  The court further found that complete diversity existed at the time the case was
removed.  Id. at *2.
69. Id. 
70. Id. (citing Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961)).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at *3.
75. Id.
76. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
the [p]laintiffs . . . were citizens of Mississippi” and the defendant was a
corporation incorporated in Delaware with its principle place of business in
Illinois.67  Consequently, the court found that complete diversity existed at the
time the suit was commenced.68
The Yarbrough court next considered whether the amount in controversy
requirement was satisfied.  The ad damnum clause in the plaintiffs’ complaint
sought “damages of $74,999 per [p]laintiff, including punitive and actual
damages, court costs, and attorney’s fees.”69  The court noted that the face of
the complaint dictates the amount in controversy analysis, “unless it appears
that the amount . . . is not claimed in good faith.”70  Nonetheless, “if a
defendant can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in
controversy actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount, removal is
proper . . . .”71
Although the complaint sought damages of $74,999 per plaintiff, including
punitive damages,72 under Mississippi law plaintiffs’ claims for punitive
damages are aggregated to determine the amount in controversy.73
Consequently, the court ruled “that the [p]laintiffs, in the aggregate, will more
likely than not be able to recover far more than $75,000 in punitive damages.
Similar cases involving financing disputes in Mississippi and Alabama have
resulted in jury verdicts for punitive damages in the millions.”74  Accordingly,
because the plaintiffs and the defendant were citizens of different states, and
because the matter in controversy exceeded $75,000, the Yarbrough court
found that removal was proper, and denied the defendant’s motion to
remand.75
III. Case Law Construing Post-Removal Damage Stipulations
As explained above, many states prohibit plaintiffs from pleading a specific
amount of damages in the complaint.76  As a result, the amount of damages
sought is ambiguous, and plaintiffs often file post-removal damage
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78. See id.
79. See In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that post-
removal stipulations reducing the amount in controversy do not deprive a district court of
jurisdiction).  As explained below, whether some courts actually adhere to this principle is
questionable.
80. Egan v. Premier Scales & Sys., 237 F. Supp. 2d 774, 776-77 (W.D. Ky. 2002).
81. See Quinn v. Kimble, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1040 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (recognizing that
“[t]he Eighth Circuit has not addressed whether post-removal stipulations may be considered
in determining whether a case should be remanded, and other circuits are split on the issue”).
82. See Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 2002); Rogers v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2000); Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d at 355.  A few district courts
take a similar approach.  See Halstead v. Southerncare, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-76, 2005 WL
2261454, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2005) (recognizing that “such a [damage] stipulation
would constitute a post-removal event having no bearing on the propriety of removal”);
Simmons v. PCR Tech., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating that “[t]he court
gives little credence to plaintiff’s post-removal statements”).
83. Compare Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 2002), with Angus v.
Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1993).
84. 286 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 2002).
85. Id. at 663.
stipulations, purportedly to “clarify” the amount in controversy.77  These
stipulations are filed after a case has been removed from state to federal court
and are designed to defeat diversity jurisdiction.78
Under St. Paul Mercury, however, a plaintiff may not reduce or change her
demand for damages by way of stipulation to defeat diversity jurisdiction.79
Therefore, the “narrow issue,” as one court put it, is whether a plaintiff may
use a post-removal damage stipulation to “clarify the amount at issue,” or
whether such stipulations must be disregarded when determining the amount
in controversy.80  Several federal circuit courts of appeal have yet to squarely
decide the issue, and other circuits are split.81
A. Courts that Refuse to Recognize Post-Removal Damage Stipulations
The U.S. Courts of Appeal for the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have
held that post-removal damage stipulations should be disregarded and not
considered in the amount in controversy analysis.82  These circuits, and their
treatment of post-removal damage stipulations, are discussed below.
The Third Circuit has offered conflicting approaches with respect to post-
removal stipulations.83  In Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co.,84 the plaintiffs filed
a putative class action in Pennsylvania state court, alleging that they purchased
vehicles from Ford that contained defective transmission components.85  The
complaint asserted that the plaintiffs’ claims exceeded $50,000, when the
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90. Id. (quoting Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1993) (alteration in
original)).
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92. 989 F.2d 142.
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94. 230 F.3d 868 (6th Cir. 2000).
95. Id. at 870.
96. Id. 
97. Id.
jurisdictional minimum required an amount in excess of $75,000.86  “Ford . . .
removed the case to [federal] district court on the basis of diversity
[jurisdiction].”87  The plaintiffs then filed a motion to remand, stating that
“individual claims for compensatory damages . . . will rarely exceed $2,000,
and will not exceed $3,000.”88  The district court denied the motion to remand,
and the Third Circuit affirmed.
The Werwinski court first stated that the amount in controversy must be
determined by “the ‘plaintiff’s complaint at the time the petition for removal
was filed.’”89  The amount must be measured “‘not . . . by the low end of an
open-ended claim, but rather by a reasonable reading of the value of the rights
being litigated.’”90  Because the amount in controversy must be determined by
the complaint, “a plaintiff’s stipulation subsequent to removal as to the amount
in controversy . . . is of ‘no legal significance’ to the court’s determination.”91
In an earlier case, however, the Third Circuit stated that a district court may
consider a post-removal stipulation for purposes of clarification.  In Angus v.
Shiley Inc.,92 the court noted in dicta that if a complaint is (1) ambiguous as to
damages, and (2) “the controversy seems small, it is conceivable that a court
justifiably might consider a subsequent stipulation as clarifying rather than
amending an original pleading.”93  The Werwinski and Angus cases indicate
that Third Circuit case law is somewhat unsettled with respect to damage
stipulations.
The Sixth Circuit appears to hold that post-removal damage stipulations
should not be recognized.  In Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,94 Rogers
“tripped and fell on a wooden pallet . . . in an aisle of a Wal-Mart store.”95  She
then filed a complaint in a Tennessee state court, alleging that Wal-Mart
employees negligently left the pallet in a shopping area.96  In her complaint,
Rogers sought approximately $950,000 in damages.97  Wal-Mart removed the
case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, and the parties later
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106. Id. at 872.
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108. 970 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1992).
109. Rogers, 230 F.3d at 872 (quoting Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d at 356).
agreed to dismiss the case without prejudice on October 9, 1998, which the
district court entered on October 14, 1998.98
On February 4, 1999, Rogers filed a second complaint in Tennessee state
court.99  This complaint alleged the same set of facts as the first complaint, but
stated that Rogers sought damages in an amount “not exceeding $75,000.”100
Wal-Mart again filed a motion to remove, citing Rogers’s answers to
interrogatories where she estimated her damages at $447,000.101  Rogers
responded with a motion to remand, and “submitted an affidavit stating that
she . . . instructed [her] attorney to stipulate that [her] demand for damages
will not exceed $75,000 at any time in the future.”102  In addition, Rogers filed
a stipulation providing that her damages did not exceed $75,000 and that she
would not attempt to amend her complaint for additional damages.103  The
district court denied Rogers’s motion to remand, and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed.104
The Rogers court first recognized that “in reviewing the denial of a motion
to remand, a court [must examine] ‘whether the action was properly removed
in the first place.’”105  Because Rogers had previously sought far more than
$75,000, the court ruled that “[i]f  one does not take into account plaintiff’s
post-removal stipulation, then there is no question that . . . at the time of
removal, the amount in controversy was ‘more likely than not’ above the
$75,000 pleaded in the plaintiff’s complaint.”106
The issue, then, was whether the plaintiff’s post-removal damage stipulation
should be recognized.107  The Sixth Circuit answered that question in the
negative.  Citing In re Shell Oil Co.,108 the court ruled that “‘because
jurisdiction is determined as of the instant of removal, a post-removal affidavit
or stipulation is no more effective than a post-removal amendment of the
complaint.’”109
Accordingly, and consistent with St. Paul Mercury, the Rogers court held
that a “post-removal stipulation reducing the amount in controversy to below
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113. District courts within the Sixth Circuit have interpreted Rogers in varying manners.
Compare Egan v. Premier Scales & Sys., 237 F. Supp. 2d 774, 776-77 (W.D. Ky. 2002)
(arguing that Rogers did not address the “narrow issue” of whether a stipulation may be
considered to “clarify” an ambiguous complaint), with Fenger v. Idexx Labs., Inc., 194 F. Supp.
2d 601, 604 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (stating that “[t]he breadth of . . . Rogers remains unclear”).   A
reasonable interpretation, however, is that the Rogers court unconditionally rejected post-
removal stipulations.  The court stressed that such stipulations should be afforded “no effect.”
Rogers, 230 F.3d at 873.  In addition, the court stressed that post-removal stipulations must not
be recognized to prevent forum shopping, and to promote uniformity and simplicity.  Id. at 872-
73.  These laudable goals would be undermined if post-removal stipulations were recognized
in some cases and not in others.
114. Chase v. Shop ’N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 1999); Shell Oil
Co., 970 F.2d 355.
115. 110 F.3d 424 (7th Cir. 1997).
116. Id. at 426.
117. Id.
118. Id. (quotation omitted).
119. Id.
120. Id.
the jurisdictional limit does not require remand to state court.”110  The court
found that this holding was also dictated by “sound policy.”111  “If plaintiffs
were able to defeat jurisdiction by way of a post-removal stipulation, they
could unfairly manipulate proceedings merely because their federal case
begins to look unfavorable.  Moreover, the interests of simplicity and
uniformity dictate that post-removal stipulations be treated just like any other
post-removal event.”112
Under Rogers, it appears that the Sixth Circuit will not recognize a post-
removal damage stipulation, whether binding or not, to determine whether the
jurisdictional minimum is satisfied.113
Finally, the Seventh Circuit holds that a post-removal damage stipulation
should not be recognized in an amount in controversy analysis.114  In Chase v.
Shop ’N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc.,115 Chase was assaulted by an unknown
person in Shop ’N Save’s store parking lot.116  She then filed a one-count
complaint in Illinois state court, alleging many injuries, including disabling
head injuries and mental anguish.117  Because Illinois law does not allow a
plaintiff to plead a specific amount of damages, Chase’s complaint simply
alleged “damages in excess of $15,000.”118
Shop ’N Save removed the action to federal district court on the basis of
diversity jurisdiction.119  “Chase responded with a motion to remand,” and the
district court denied that motion.120  “[A]fter Shop ’N Save filed a motion for
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130. Id.
131. Id. at 430 (quoting Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d at 356 (emphasis added)).
summary judgment . . . Chase . . . obtained an order granting voluntary
dismissal of her claim.”121  One year later, Chase filed a second action for
negligence in Illinois state court, which was based on the same facts as alleged
in her first complaint.122  Shop ’N Save again removed the case to federal
court.  Chase filed a motion to remand, and stipulated that her claim was not
above the jurisdictional amount.123  The district court denied Chase’s motion
to remand, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.124
The Seventh Circuit first noted that “[t]he starting point in determining the
amount in controversy is typically the face of the complaint.”125  Because
Illinois law prohibits parties from requesting a specific amount of monetary
damages,126 however, the complaint itself was unhelpful.  Under these
circumstances, “the district court may look outside the pleadings to other
evidence of jurisdictional amount in the record.”127  The court stated that any
outside evidence, however, must have been “available at the moment the
removal petition was filed.”128
Under this backdrop, the court “held that post-removal affidavits or
stipulations are ineffective to oust federal jurisdiction.”129  Therefore, because
Chase’s damage stipulation “came one month post-removal, [it was] too
late . . . to consider.”130  The court further found that “[d]espite the Illinois ad
damnum restriction, a plaintiff . . . who wants to proceed in state court, can
control her forum by . . . ‘fil[ing] a binding stipulation or affidavit with [her]
complaint[]; once a defendant has removed the case, St. Paul makes later
filings irrelevant.’”131
 Consequently, and as a practical matter, courts in the Seventh Circuit will
not recognize a post-removal damage stipulation in deciding a motion to
remand.  Instead, if a plaintiff wants to prevent removal, she must file a
binding damage stipulation at the same time she files her complaint.
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is unrebutted, and when the defendant’s notice of removal only offers conclusory information
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amount in controversy at the time of removal”); Satterfield v. F.W. Webb, Inc., 334 F. Supp.
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stipulations,” they may be used when the amount in controversy is “indeterminate”); Cleary v.
Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., No. Civ.A. 03-1718, 2003 WL 21977163, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 15,
2003) (stating that a damages stipulation may be considered if the amount in controversy is
ambiguous at the time of removal); Quinn v. Kimble, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1040 (E.D. Mo.
2002) (considering post-removal stipulation “for clarification purposes only”); Dyrda v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 2d 943, 949 (D. Minn. 1999) (stating that “[a] post petition
affidavit is relevant to clear up the ambiguity in the amount of damages that were alleged at the
time of removal”).
134. A-Best Sewer & Drain Serv., Inc. v. A Corp., No. Civ.A. 05-253, 2005 WL 1038419,
at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 22, 2005) (citing Fifth Circuit precedent for the proposition that “[t]he
Court may consider a plaintiff’s post-removal affidavit that clarifies the amount in controversy
only when the petition is ambiguous” (citing Asociacion Nacional, 988 F.2d at 565)).
135. 233 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 2000).
136. Id. at 881.
B. Courts that Recognize Post-Removal Damage Stipulations to  “Clarify”
the Amount of Damages Sought in the Plaintiff’s Complaint
In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit132 and a myriad
of federal district courts133 have held that post-removal damage stipulations
may be considered to clarify the amount in controversy.  These courts reason
that a post-removal damage stipulation merely serves to clarify, but not reduce,
the amount of damages when a state rule prohibits a specific demand for
damages in a complaint.  The following discussion examines a representative
sample of these decisions.
The Fifth Circuit holds that a post-removal damage stipulation may be
considered in deciding a motion to remand, but only when the complaint is
ambiguous.134  For example, in Gebbia v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,135 the plaintiff
was shopping in a Wal-Mart store when she slipped and fell in the produce
section.136  She filed suit in Louisiana state court, seeking damages for, among
other things, medical expenses, physical and mental suffering, loss of wages,
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139. Id. at 881-82.
140. Id. at 882.
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143. Id. at 882, 884.
144. Id. at 883.
145. Id. at 881-82.
146. Id. at 882.
147. Id. at 883 (citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 292
(1938)).
148. Id.
and permanent disability.137  Pursuant to Louisiana state law, however, the
plaintiff was prohibited from pleading a specific amount of damages.138 
The defendant removed the case on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, and
the plaintiff responded with a motion to remand.139  Along with the motion, the
plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that her damages were less than $75,000.140
The district court denied the motion to remand, finding that the “[p]laintiff’s
[complaint] at the time of removal alleged injuries that exceeded $75,000.”141
Based on medical evidence, the plaintiff then filed a motion for
reconsideration with a stipulation, stating that her claims did not exceed
$75,000.142  The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, and the
Fifth Circuit affirmed.143
The Gebbia court recognized that post-removal stipulations may be
considered only if the amount of damages sought is ambiguous at the time of
removal.144  Because Louisiana law prohibited the plaintiff from pleading a
specific amount of damages, the plaintiff argued that the amount of damages
she sought was unclear.145  Therefore, she asserted her stipulation should be
recognized.146
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that “if it is facially apparent from the
petition that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 at the time of
removal, post-removal affidavits, stipulations, and amendments reducing the
amount do not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.”147  In Gebbia, the
petition sought damages for medical expenses, physical and mental suffering,
loss of wages, and permanent disability and disfigurement.148  On the basis of
these factors, the court held that “[b]ecause it was facially apparent that
[p]laintiff’s claimed damages exceeded $75,000, the district court properly
disregarded [p]laintiff’s post-removal affidavit and stipulation for damages . . .
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and such affidavit and stipulation did not divest the district court’s juris-
diction.”149
District courts in numerous federal circuits have also held that post-removal
damage stipulations can be considered for purposes of “clarifying” an
otherwise ambiguous complaint.150  For example, in Halsne v. Liberty Mutual
Group,151 Halsne filed an action in Iowa state court alleging that his insurer
failed in bad faith to pay his medical bills.152 The defendant removed the action
to federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction, and Halsne filed a
motion to remand.153  At oral arguments, Halsne stipulated that he did not seek
more than $75,000 in damages.154  The Halsne court then considered “whether
such a stipulation is effective to defeat this court’s subject matter jurisdiction
on removal.”155
The court first recognized that because Iowa law prohibited Halsne from
pleading a specific amount in controversy, the complaint itself provided little
guidance concerning the amount of damages.156  In this regard, the court found
that
Generally, such a post-removal stipulation limiting the amount in
controversy — like a post-removal amendment — would not defeat
removal jurisdiction.  However, this general rule has consistently
been applied to cases in which the petition at the time of the
removal expressly stated a claim in excess of the jurisdictional
amount, and therefore, removal jurisdiction had already
attached. . . .  Here, the proffered stipulation indicates that the value
of the claim at the time of removal did not exceed the jurisdictional
minimum, in a situation where pleading rules make the amount in
controversy on the face of the complaint ambiguous at best.  In
these circumstances, the stipulation serves to clarify rather than
amend the pleadings.  Consideration of such a ‘clarifying’
stipulation is in accord with the fundamental principle of removal
jurisdiction that whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a
question answered by looking to the complaint as it existed at the
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time the petition for removal was filed, as well as the further
principles that the court’s removal jurisdiction must be strictly
construed, and that the court is required to resolve all doubts about
federal jurisdiction in favor of remand.157
Therefore, the Halsne court held that because the ad damnum clause was
ambiguous, a post-removal damage stipulation could be used to destroy
diversity jurisdiction.
Similarly, in Ryan v. Cerullo,158 Ryan filed a complaint in Connecticut state
court against an accountant and the accountant’s partnership.159  The
defendants removed the case to the federal district court, and Ryan filed a
motion to remand.160  Ryan attached an affidavit to his motion to remand
stating that his damages did not exceed $75,000.161  He also filed a brief
arguing that his damages “add up to $62,325.03,” and a sworn stipulation that
stated, “‘in no circumstances shall the damages, exclusive of interest and costs,
be in excess of [$75,000].’”162
The Ryan court began its analysis by repeating the oft-cited rule from St.
Paul Mercury that “once a federal district court’s jurisdiction has attached to
a case removed from state court, a plaintiff cannot deprive the district court of
jurisdiction by reducing his claim . . . ‘by stipulation, by affidavit, or by
amendment of his pleadings.’”163  The court then ruled, however, that a
plaintiff is permitted to “clarify” the complaint after removal if it is silent or
ambiguous as to the amount in controversy.164
Under Connecticut law, a complaint must simply state whether the alleged
damages are (1) $15,000 or more, exclusive of interest and costs; (2) between
$2500 and $15,000 exclusive of interest and costs; or (3) less than $2500,
exclusive of interest and costs.165  In conformance with Connecticut law,
Ryan’s complaint merely stated that the amount in controversy was “greater
than [$15,000].”166  Therefore, because the post-removal damage stipulation
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merely served to clarify Ryan’s complaint, the court considered it, and then
remanded the case to state court.167
Finally, in Brooks v. Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc.,168 the plaintiffs’
complaint alleged the defendants fraudulently sold them legal insurance.169
The complaint, filed in Alabama state court, sought compensatory damages of
$74,500 and an unspecified amount of punitive damages.170  The defendants
removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction, and the
plaintiffs filed a motion to remand.171  Along with this motion, the plaintiffs
also “filed an affidavit stating that . . . they [would] never claim or accept more
than $74,500 [and would] agree to a court order capping their damages at
$74,500.”172
The Brooks court framed the issue as “whether a court can remand a case
when a plaintiff’s post-removal stipulation limits the scope of an ad damnum
clause to less than $74,500.”173  In resolving this issue, the court first
acknowledged that some courts refuse to recognize post-removal damage
stipulations for two reasons.174  First, post-removal stipulations “ostensibly are
inconsistent with [St. Paul Mercury], which teaches that courts must determine
jurisdiction as of the moment of filing rather than on the basis of subsequent
events.”175  Second, post-removal stipulations may “lead to forum shopping by
[plaintiffs] who might ‘unfairly manipulate proceedings merely because their
federal case begins to look unfavorable.’”176  The Brooks court was not
impressed by either rationale, and believed that “these unpersuasive decisions
have improvidently expanded the holding of St. Paul and have given unduly
narrow consideration to the basic principles of federal jurisdiction.”177
The court first held that St. Paul Mercury did not prohibit post-removal
stipulations.178  Instead, the Brooks court noted that in St. Paul Mercury the
plaintiff admitted that the complaint satisfied the jurisdictional minimum at the
time of removal.179  Therefore, according to Brooks, St. Paul Mercury only
prohibited post-removal stipulations from divesting federal jurisdiction that
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had already attached.180  In Brooks, however, the plaintiffs “submitted
affidavits bearing on their initial demand and showing that federal jurisdiction
has never properly attached.”181
In addition, the court found that “four bedrock principles of federal
jurisdiction require courts to effectuate post-removal stipulations.”182  The first
principle is that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.183  Second,
“the diversity statute is [to be] strictly construed because of . . . federalism
concerns raised by federal courts [presiding over] matters of state law.184
Third, because “a plaintiff is the master of her complaint,” she is entitled to
limit her damages to less than $75,000 and thereby avoid federal court.185
Finally, “a plaintiff [has] knowledge of her complaint, and the amount of
damages she seeks.”186  According to the Brooks court, “[n]one of these
interests are furthered when a federal court keeps a diversity case because of
some doctrinaire reading of judicial dicta that is divorced from congressional
will and any legitimate policy interests.”187  For these reasons, the Brooks court
accepted the plaintiffs’ damage stipulation, and remanded the case to state
court.
IV. Why Should We Care?
The treatment of post-removal damage stipulations is a model of
inconsistency.  Some courts appear willing to remand a case under the auspices
of a post-removal damage stipulation,188 while some only consider a post-
removal damage stipulation to the extent it “clarifies” the damages sought in
the complaint.189  Still others banish post-removal damage stipulations from
the amount in controversy analysis altogether.190
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jurisdiction, we are to look at the case as of the time it was filed in state court — prior to the
time the defendants filed their answer in federal court”).
One possible explanation for this inconsistent treatment is that there appears
to be two types of post-removal damage stipulations.  The first type of
stipulation is filed because of a state law restriction on ad damnum clauses.
If a plaintiff is prohibited from pleading a specific amount of damages in her
state complaint, a post-removal damage stipulation may be the first
opportunity to specify the amount of damages sought.  Under these
circumstances, a plaintiff who files a damage stipulation may not be acting in
bad faith, or with the specific intent of destroying diversity jurisdiction.
Instead, the plaintiff is merely attempting to “clarify” the amount in
controversy.
The second type of post-removal damage stipulation is filed with the intent
of destroying diversity.  For example, regardless of any ad damnum restriction,
a plaintiff who files a damage stipulation after her case begins to look
unfavorable once in federal court is more likely than not attempting to
improperly manipulate diversity jurisdiction.191  Under these circumstances,
a plaintiff’s intent is to waive, or trade, her potential right to additional
damages for a more favorable state court forum. 
Regardless of the plaintiff’s motive for filing a post-removal damage
stipulation, courts should treat all such stipulations equally for at least one of
the following five reasons.  First, recognizing post-removal damage
stipulations disregards Supreme Court precedent, clearly exceeding the
authority of the lower courts.  Second, recognizing post-removal damage
stipulations disregards congressional intent by denying a defendant her
statutorily protected right to defend an action in federal court.  Third,
recognizing post-removal damage stipulations encourages forum shopping.
This result is particularly troubling when a plaintiff resorts to a damage
stipulation after her claim in federal court begins to turn sour.  Fourth, post-
removal damage stipulations are an unreliable way to gauge the amount of
damages at issue.  Finally, the inconsistent treatment of post-removal
stipulations generates unpredictability in litigation and wastes judicial
resources.  It therefore goes without saying that our civil justice system suffers
as a result.  These concerns are addressed in more detail below.
First, “[t]he Supreme Court has long discouraged reliance on post-removal
stipulations and affidavits.”192  As St. Paul Mercury held, events that occur
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193. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289-90 (1938).
194. In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992).
195. Halsne v. Liberty Mut. Group, 40 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1092 (N.D. Iowa 1999).
196. See Lawson v. Tyco Elec. Corp., 286 F. Supp. 2d 639, 642 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (stating
that because “the amount in controversy is indeterminate from the face of the complaint, the
court will acknowledge [p]laintiff’s stipulation”); Dyrda v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 41 F. Supp.
2d 943, 949 (D. Minn. 1999) (holding that because state law prohibited the plaintiff from
pleading an amount greater than $50,000 but less than $75,000, the “post-petition affidavit is
relevant to clear up the ambiguity in the amount of damages that were alleged at the time of
removal”).
197. Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d at 356.
198. Cole v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 728 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (E.D. Ky. 1990) (citing
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20 § 12, 1 Stat. 73).
199. Douglas Energy of N.Y., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 585 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D. Kan. 1984).
“subsequent to the institution of suit which reduce the amount recoverable
below the statutory limit do not oust jurisdiction.”193  Consequently, once a
defendant has removed a case, St. Paul Mercury demands that subsequent
stipulations must be disregarded in determining the amount in controversy.194
Many cases half-heartedly distinguish St. Paul Mercury by holding that
post-removal damage stipulations simply “clarify,” but do not change the
amount in controversy.195  According to these courts, clarification is needed
when state law prohibits a plaintiff from pleading a specific amount of
damages.196
As explained above, restrictions on ad damnum clauses force some
plaintiffs to clarify the amount of damages with a post-removal stipulation.
Other plaintiffs may intend to fraudulently defeat diversity jurisdiction after
their case in federal court begins to look unfavorable.  But a plaintiff’s good-
faith or evil intent is not at issue. The rule on post-removal damage stipulation
was decided long ago by the Supreme Court.  If a plaintiff wishes to avoid
removal and have her case tried in state court, she “must file a binding
stipulation or affidavit with [her] complaint[]; once a defendant has removed
the case, St. Paul makes later filings irrelevant.”197  Courts that consider post-
removal damage stipulations for clarification or otherwise are impermissibly
making such stipulations relevant, either expressly or implicitly.
Second, post-removal damage stipulations thwart the purpose of removal
of cases from state to federal court, as evidenced by the original Judiciary Act
of 1789.198  As indicated above, it is a “familiar notion that Congress has
created diversity jurisdiction and the right of removal . . . for the purpose of
protecting out-of-state litigants from local prejudice . . . .”199  Therefore,
so long as federal diversity jurisdiction exists . . . the need for its
assertion may well be greatest when the plaintiff tries hardest to
defeat it.  The plaintiff who chooses to sue a non-citizen defendant
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200. Id. at 548 (alteration in original) (quotations omitted).
201. See Glazer & Assocs., P.C. v. Teleport, Inc., No. Civ.01-1080-ST, 2001 WL 34041792,
at *4 (D. Or. Sept. 13, 2001) (recognizing that allowing “a plaintiff to defeat jurisdiction by
post-removal pleading manipulation . . . undermine[s] a defendant’s statutory right of
removal”).
202. United States v. Childress, 104 F.3d 47, 53 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that “Congress’ role
is to enact statutes; the judiciary’s to interpret those statutes as written”).
203. See supra note 48.
204. Schexnayder v. Entergy La., Inc., 394 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2004).
205. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2000) (providing in part that “[a]n order remanding a case to
the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise”).
206. Lastimosa, supra note 3, at 645-46 (arguing that the “plaintiff’s use of a damage
stipulation to destroy federal jurisdiction has forum control as its primary motive”).
207. Roadmaster Corp. v. NordicTrack, Inc., Civ. A. No. 93 C 1260, 1993 WL 625537, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 20, 1993).
208. Brooks v. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2001);
see also Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 872 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[i]f
plaintiffs were able to defeat jurisdiction by way of a post-removal stipulation, they could
in a state court may be motivated by the hope that the out-of-state
defendant will be at a substantial disadvantage in that court and the
likelihood of such motivation increases with the lengths to which
the plaintiff will go to prevent removal to a federal forum.200
For these reasons, both the diversity and removal statute should be interpreted
in a manner that protects out-of-state parties from local bias and prejudice.
When a plaintiff is willing to limit her damages in exchange for home-field
advantage, it logically follows that she expects to benefit from local bias.  A
court that facilitates this trade-off by recognizing post-removal damage
stipulations undermines Congress’s desire to protect out-of-state defendants
from local prejudice.201  This recognition therefore invades the province of the
legislative branch; Congress’s role is to enact statutes, and the judiciary has a
duty to interpret statutes as drafted.202  Further, as discussed above,203 a district
court’s decision to remand a case is generally immunized from appellate
review.204  Therefore, if a post-removal damage stipulation is the cause of a
remand, the defendant’s right to remove is thwarted, and the defendant cannot
even appeal that ruling.205
Third, the recognition of post-removal damage stipulations may encourage
plaintiffs to forum shop.206  Forum shopping occurs when a party “seek[s] out
a forum solely on the basis of having the suit heard in a forum where the law
or judiciary is more favorable to one’s cause than in another.”207  Many courts
have expressed concerns “about plaintiffs who devilishly move to limit their
damages and return to state court only after litigation has taken an unfavorable
turn.”208  Of course, some may argue that forum shopping is simply strategic
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol58/iss2/3
2005] POST-REMOVAL DAMAGE STIPULATIONS 245
unfairly manipulate proceedings merely because their federal case begins to look unfavorable”);
Simmons v. PCR Tech., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1033 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (stating that post-removal
stipulations are “likely to manipulate the amount in controversy to secure jurisdiction in the
desired court”).
209. 981 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
210. Id. at 1415.
211. Id. 
212. E.g., Looney v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 03-0647-CV-W-FJG, 2004 WL 1918720, at *6
(W.D. Mo. Aug. 19, 2004) (stating that because the plaintiff waited nearly eight months after
removal to file a damages stipulation, it was “simply an attempt to avoid an adverse judgment
in federal court”).
213. Purple Passion, Inc. v. RCN Telecom Servs., Inc., No. 05C1V3795GEL, 2005 WL
1944268, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 2005) (refusing to remand a case on the basis of a
subsequent amendment of the complaint).
lawyering.  Semantics aside, using a post-removal damage stipulation after a
state court and the parties have invested extensive time and resources into a
case is troubling.  It is also a practice that, as explained throughout this article,
is contrary to Supreme Court precedent.
These concerns are justified.  For example, in Bailey v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.,209 the plaintiff filed a motion to remand, and expressly stated that her
damages did not exceed $49,999 at a time when the amount in controversy was
$50,000.210  This stipulation came only after the federal district court judge
granted partial summary judgment in favor of the defendant, over sixteen
months after the defendant removed the case.211  The facts of Bailey and
similar cases212 demonstrate that plaintiffs are willing to use post-removal
stipulations to escape federal court when their case begins to look unfavorable.
Indeed, as one court recently recognized under similar facts, the recognition
of a post-removal event
facilitates gamesmanship and forum- and judge-shopping by
encouraging plaintiffs filing in state court to seek exorbitant
damages against the chance the case will not be removed, and then
to reduce their demands if the case is removed to federal court, or
not, depending on their happiness with the assigned judge.  Such
gamesmanship, and the resulting ping-ponging of cases from state
to federal court and back again, should not be permitted.213
Fourth, post-removal damage stipulations are little more than a short-cut —
a conclusory method to determine the amount in controversy.  This is certainly
not a desirable way to determine whether a federal court should exercise
jurisdiction over a case.  An independent, and more reliable damages analysis
would, for example, rigorously examine
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214. Watterson v. GMRI, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (citations
omitted); see also Campbell v. Rests. First/Neighborhood Rest., Inc., 303 F. Supp. 2d 797, 798
(S.D. W. Va. 2004) (holding that a post-removal affidavit is ineffective to destroy diversity
jurisdiction, and instead finding that “a variety of other factors” should be examined to
determine whether the jurisdictional minimum is satisfied).
215. Lisa Combs Foster, Note, Section 1447(e)’s Discretionary Joinder and Remand: Speedy
Justice or Docket Clearing?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 118, 145 (1990) (recognizing that “[t]he problem
of federal court overload is structural; too few courts, judges, and resources cannot match the
demand placed on the courts by rising caseloads”).
216. Stare decisis is a doctrine that provides courts should adhere to previous decisions and
refrain from undoing settled issues.  Mendenhall v. Cedarapids, Inc., 5 F.3d 1557, 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).  It has been described as “one of the fundamental building blocks of our nation’s
legal system.”  Bankers Trust N.Y. Corp. v. United States, 36 Fed. Cl. 30, 37 (1996), rev’d on
other grounds, 225 F.3d 1368 (2000).
217. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897, 2000 WL 204061,
at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 10, 2000).
the type and extent of the plaintiff’s injuries and the possible
damages recoverable therefore, including punitive damages if
appropriate.  The possible damages recoverable may be shown by
the amounts awarded in other similar cases.  Another factor for the
court to consider would be the expenses or losses incurred by the
plaintiff up to the date the notice of removal was filed.214
Of course, a post-removal damage stipulation may make it easier and less
time-consuming for the court to decide a motion to remand; therefore, such
stipulations may be welcomed by a federal judiciary that is increasingly
overworked and under-funded.215  Neither the Supreme Court or Congress,
however, have injected expediency into the amount in controversy equation.
Until and unless Congress or the Supreme Court instructs otherwise, lower
courts exceed their authority by recognizing post-removal damage stipulations
and denying a defendant her statutory right to removal. 
Finally, consistency and predictability are lost when courts apply
contradictory standards to post-removal damage stipulations.  As with the
doctrine of stare decisis,216 a uniform standard with respect to post-removal
stipulations would “provide predictability, continuity, and consistency in the
law so that the populace may expect courts to apply the same or similar legal
maxims to similar factual scenarios.”217  Consistency in the law helps ensure
that procedural and substantive rules are not arbitrarily or selectively enforced
against either party.  It also allows parties to plan and develop their case or
defense without the fear of unknown pitfalls. 
For example, without a uniform standard that restricts the use of post-
removal damage stipulations, defendants could expend significant resources
and time in federal court, only to then have the case remanded.  Furthermore,
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218. Millar v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
219. 28 U.S.C. § 1447 is entitled “Procedure after removal generally.”
220. See supra notes 192-218 and accompanying text.
judicial economy may also be compromised.  If remand is granted after the
federal court has “performed a substantial amount of legal analysis,” the state
court may have to consider the same issues and legal arguments once again.218
Bouncing back and forth between state and federal court wastes the time and
resources of the court and the parties, and slows the wheels of justice.
V. Solutions to the Post-Removal Damage Stipulation Problem
Despite the deleterious consequences discussed above, some courts continue
to recognize post-removal damage stipulations.  The following discussion
offers several solutions to steer these, and other jurisdictions yet to decide the
issue, in the right direction.  Although some solutions may be more favorable
than others, they all share the common goal of prohibiting, or at least
restricting, the recognition of post-removal damage stipulations.
A. The Removal Statute Should Be Amended to Specifically Address Post-
Removal Damage Stipulations
The removal statute should be amended to require a plaintiff to file, within
ten days after the defendant’s notice of removal, a stipulation on damages.  For
example, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(f)219 could be amended to provide that 
(f)  If jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332, then within ten
days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a),
the plaintiff shall file a stipulation, under penalty of perjury, stating
her reasonable estimate of damages.  The stipulation shall only
state the plaintiff’s damages as of the date the notice of removal
was filed.  The district court shall consider the post-removal
stipulation in determining the amount in controversy, but the
stipulation shall not be deemed dispositive with respect to the
amount of damages.  Other relevant factors shall also be considered
by the court.  
The district court shall strike any post-removal damage
stipulation filed after the ten day period has elapsed, and shall not
consider it in deciding a motion to remand.  In its discretion, the
district court may sanction a party that fails to comply with the
requirements of this provision.
This amendment would alleviate many of the problems associated with
post-removal damage stipulations as described above.220  First, it complies with
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221. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 290 (1938).
222. Chase v. Shop ’N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 430 (7th Cir. 1997)
(citing Shaw v. Dow Brands, Inc., 994 F.2d 364, 367 (7th Cir. 1993)).
223. Hanna v. Miller, 163 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1306 (D.N.M. 2001).
224. See Engel v. Chevron Corp., Inc., No. 3:96-CV-377, 1996 WL 1687454, at *1 (E.D.
Tenn. June 21, 1996) (stating that “[w]hether or not the amount in controversy has been met is
the difficult question that this court must answer”).
225. See Millar v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 236 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1116 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (explaining that judicial resources may be wasted in the process of removing and
remanding a case).
226. Brooks v. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1301-02 (M.D. Ala. 2001);
see also St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 290 (stating that a plaintiff “knows or should know
whether his claim is within the statutory requirement as to amount”).
St. Paul Mercury by only recognizing the amount in controversy at the
moment the case was removed.221  Second, “allowing a plaintiff to follow the
‘wait and see’ approach to choosing her forum is unfair to defendants.”222  By
requiring that all damage stipulations be filed within ten days after removal,
the amendment would curtail undesirable forum shopping by plaintiffs.  It
would also help ensure that restrictions on ad damnum clauses in state courts
do not force a plaintiff to try her case in federal court.  If, because of ad
damnum restrictions, a plaintiff innocently files a damage stipulation to
“clarify” the amount of damages she seeks, the amendment would permit her
to do so if the stipulation was filed within ten days.
Third, the amendment provides that the district court must consider the
stipulation in its amount in controversy analysis, but that the stipulation does
not control the issue of damages.  This requirement helps ensure that the
district court takes a holistic approach to the amount in controversy.  The court
must consider not only the plaintiff’s damage stipulation, but other relevant
factors, such as “the substance and nature of the injuries and damages
described in the pleadings.”223  This independent analysis would provide a
more accurate estimate of damages than simple reliance on a plaintiff’s
stipulation.  Fourth, determining the amount in controversy is not always an
easy task.224  Therefore, a timely filed stipulation may save the court time and
resources in deciding whether it may exercise jurisdiction.225
Finally, “a plaintiff is charged with knowledge of her complaint, and the
amount of damages that she seeks.”226  Therefore, as a practical matter, the
requirements imposed by the amendment are not onerous and can be easily
complied with.
B. Courts Should Reject Post-Removal Damage Stipulations
If Congress does not amend the removal statue, courts should uniformly
reject post-removal damage stipulations, and such stipulations should play no
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227. See Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that a
“plaintiff’s stipulation subsequent to removal as to the amount in controversy . . . is of ‘no legal
significance’ to the court’s determination”); Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 230 F.3d 868, 873
(6th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[p]laintiff’s post-removal stipulation has no effect because
jurisdiction is decided as of the time of removal”).
228. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 191-96, 198-200 and accompanying text.
230. Fraudulent joinder occurs when a plaintiff joins a non-diverse party to ensure that the
complete diversity requirement is not satisfied.  Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373
F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that “[t]he doctrine of fraudulent joinder is meant to
prevent plaintiffs from joining non-diverse parties in an effort to defeat federal jurisdiction”).
231. See In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355, 356 (7th Cir. 1992) (requiring that “[l]itigants
who want to prevent removal must file a binding stipulation or affidavit with their complaint;
once a defendant has removed the case, St. Paul makes later filings irrelevant”).
232. Noble-Allgire, supra note 22, at 687-89.
233. Bechard v. Eisinger, 481 N.Y.S.2d 906, 908-09 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
part in the amount in controversy determination.227  This result is dictated by
several principles.  First, as explained above,228 recognizing post-removal
damage stipulations is inconsistent with the holding in St. Paul Mercury and
Congress’s intent to protect defendants from local bias.229  Second, it invites
mischievous forum shopping.  Third, post-removal damage stipulations are
analogous to other devices designed to destroy diversity jurisdiction, such as
fraudulent joinder.230  Indeed, it is curious why courts have not already drawn
this analogy.  Both tactics share the common goal of remanding a case back
to state court, and neither should be countenanced by federal courts.
Instead, if a plaintiff wants to prevent removal, courts should require that
a binding damages stipulation be filed with the complaint.231  Any
subsequently filed damages stipulation should be stricken and disregarded by
the court.  This bright-line rule would promote efficiency, consistency, and
would help ensure that the court’s damages inquiry is focused solely on the
amount of damages sought at the time of removal.
C. State Legislatures Should Abolish Restrictions on Ad Damnum Clauses
As discussed throughout this article, many states prohibit or restrict
plaintiffs from making a specific demand for damages in the complaint.  The
state legislatures which passed these rules had good intentions.  One goal was
to “protect[] defendants from [negative] publicity generated by multi-million
dollar claims for damages.”232  Another goal was to prevent an exaggerated
claim of damages to be read to the jury, thereby influencing the jury’s
verdict.233  Unfortunately, by restricting ad damnum clauses, these states have
also unwittingly undermined defendants’ statutory right to remove a case.
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234. Some states have enacted laws providing that the plaintiff must plead whether the
amount of damages sought is more or less than the federal jurisdictional minimum.  Noble-
Allgire, supra note 22, at 690 n.18 (quoting ARK. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (providing that “‘[i]n claims
for unliquidated damage, a demand containing no specified amount of money shall limit
recovery to an amount less than required for federal court jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship
cases, unless language of the demand indicates that the recovery sought is in excess of such
amount’” (alteration in original)); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 893(A) (providing that “‘[i]f
a specific amount of damages is necessary to establish . . . the lack of jurisdiction of federal
courts due to insufficiency of damages . . . a general allegation that the claim . . . is less than the
requisite amount is sufficient’” (alterations in  original))).
235. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (explaining that the prohibition on
plaintiffs from alleging a specific dollar amount of damages was designed in part to protect
defendants from the “publicity generated by multi-million dollar claims for damages”).
236. See generally Noble-Allgire, supra note 22, at 689-90 (recognizing that state-imposed
restrictions on ad damnum clauses “have had the unintended effect of making it difficult for
federal courts to determine whether they have jurisdiction over the state-pleaded complaint
because the complaint either is silent as to the amount in controversy or is ambiguous as to
whether the amount exceeds the federal minimum”).
237. See, e.g., Satterfield v. F.W. Webb, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D. Me. 2004) (stating
that because Maine law prohibited the plaintiff from stating a dollar amount in her complaint,
the post-removal stipulation “served to clarify the amount in controversy”).
238. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 262 (7th ed. 1999).
239. Emrick v. Fujitec Am., Inc., No. C-04-04514 MJJ, 2005 WL 162235, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Jan. 24, 2005).
Therefore, state legislatures should do away with restrictions on ad damnum
clauses or, in the alternative, require plaintiffs to simply plead whether the
alleged damages are greater than or less than the federal jurisdictional
minimum.  Some states have already done the latter, and should be applauded
for alleviating much confusion.234  Other states should follow their lead.  True,
removing the ad damnum restriction may lead to inflated claims for damages
in some cases.235  In all cases, however, it will help ensure that a defendant can
invoke diversity jurisdiction when applicable.236
Removal of ad damnum restrictions by state legislatures will also nullify
those cases holding that post-removal damage stipulations may be used for
“clarification.”237  If a complaint specifies the amount of damages sought, or
whether the plaintiff’s damages exceed the federal jurisdictional minimum,
there is nothing left to “clarify.”
Finally, federal courts often remand cases under the guise of “comity,”
which is frequently cited as the primary reason to strictly construe the removal
statute.  Comity is “the respect a court of one state or jurisdiction shows to
another state or jurisdiction in giving effect to the other’s laws . . . .”238  In the
context of diversity jurisdiction, comity is particularly relevant because it is
“preferable for a state court judge to adjudicate state law claims.”239  To help
ensure that federal courts do not mistakenly assume diversity jurisdiction and
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240. See Ryan v. Cerullo, 343 F. Supp. 2d 157, 160 (D. Conn. 2004) (warning the plaintiff
and his counsel that failure to comply with a binding stipulation would subject them to
sanctions).
241. This section provides in part that “[a]n order remanding the case may require payment
of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the
removal.”  28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2000).  The United States Supreme Court recently held that
absent unusual circumstances, a plaintiff may be awarded attorney fees only if the removing
party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.  Martin v. Franklin Capital
Corp., 126 S. Ct. 704 (2005).
242. Brooks v. Pre-Paid Legal Servs., Inc., 153 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2001)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)).
243. Id.
244. This article has assumed throughout that plaintiffs unilaterally file post-removal
stipulations to destroy diversity jurisdiction and secure a remand back to state court.  In rare
cases, however, the plaintiff and the defendant file a joint stipulation on damages after removal.
E.g., Paul v. Hall, Civ. A. No. 95-0778, 1995 WL 384505 (E.D. La. June 26, 1995).
XXxIf a plaintiff does not demand a specific amount of damages in her complaint, courts should
decide matters of state law, state legislatures should do their part to make the
amount in controversy analysis simple and straightforward.
D. The Defendant Should Be Awarded Costs
Finally, at the very least the defendant should be reimbursed for litigation
costs incurred in the removal of the case when the ad damnum clause is vague
and the plaintiff files a post-removal damage stipulation.  Such costs would
include attorneys’ fees incurred in drafting the notice of removal and filing
fees, where applicable.240  For example, citing § 1447(c),241 the Brooks court
held that “plaintiffs, as a general rule, should pay defendants all ‘just costs and
any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the
removal’ if the defendants removed on the basis of an unspecified, arguably
ambiguous ad damnum clause.”242
The Brooks court stated that this general rule was justified by sound policy:
Although the litigants bear all of the first costs, the American
people generally suffer from overcrowded dockets and needless
state-federal friction.  If courts do not compensate defendants . . .
then courts suboptimally encourage precision in pleadings and
suboptimally protect the public’s interest in a speedy resolution on
the merits.243
Accordingly, courts should require a plaintiff to pay a defendant’s expenses
incurred in removing a case when the ad damnum clause is unclear, and when
the plaintiff failed to file a binding damages stipulation with the complaint.
As the Brooks court indicated, this rule would deter plaintiffs from using post-
removal damage stipulations as a manipulative litigation device.244
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recognize a joint post-removal damage stipulation.  These stipulations comply with St. Paul
Mercury because the plaintiff is not reducing her demand for damages; instead, both parties are
simply agreeing that the case was improperly removed in the first instance.  In this regard, the
joint stipulation is simply the functional equivalent of the defendant withdrawing her motion
to remove.  Moreover, by agreeing to such a stipulation, the defendant knowingly waives any
right to remove the case.  See Collings v. E-Z Serve Convenience Stores, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 892,
894 (N.D. Fla. 1996) (recognizing that a defendant may waive its right to remove).  She also
knowingly assumes the risk of local bias or prejudice against her.  Therefore, the concerns
discussed above are not applicable to joint post-removal damage stipulations.
XXxSuch joint stipulations, however, should not be dispositive of the amount in controversy
issue.  The court should consider the stipulation and all other relevant facts to determine if
federal jurisdiction attached at the moment of removal.  As one court noted, although a joint
stipulation “does not reduce the amount of the claims after removal, it is a factor suggesting that
the amount in controversy did not exceed [$75,000] prior to removal.”  Paul, 1995 WL 384505,
at *2 n.3.
VI. Conclusion
Post-removal damage stipulations should play no role in an amount in
controversy analysis.  There are many reasons for this conclusion.  The
Supreme Court indicated long ago that such stipulations should not be
considered.  When lower courts disregard that directive, they exceed their
authority and undermine the hierarchy of the federal judiciary.  The
recognition of self-serving damage stipulations to defeat diversity jurisdiction
also frustrates Congress’s intent to protect defendants from local bias.  A
plaintiff’s desire for local favoritism is particularly evident, and troubling,
when she files a damage stipulation after her case begins to look unfavorable
in federal court.  If the stipulation is not filed immediately after removal, both
the parties and the federal court could waste significant time and resources if
the case is later remanded.  Furthermore, the recognition of damage
stipulations not only promotes forum shopping and wastes resources, but
damage stipulations are also an unreliable way to assess the amount in
controversy.  Many factors should be used to determine whether the
jurisdictional minimum is satisfied, not just a plaintiff’s self-serving
stipulation.  Finally, because the law on post-removal damage stipulations is
in flux, parties may not know whether, or when, a case may be remanded.  In
contrast, courts could encourage consistency and predictability in civil
litigation by rejecting all post-removal damage stipulations.
As proposed in this article, there are many solutions to the post-removal
damage stipulation problem.  First, courts should award a defendant litigation
costs for the needless movement between state and federal court.  Second, the
Supreme Court indicated long ago that post-removal damage stipulations
should be disregarded.  Therefore, lower courts should comply with the
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judicial hierarchy and reject such stipulations.  Third, state legislatures should
abolish ad damnum restrictions, and allow plaintiffs to freely plead the amount
of damages allegedly at issue.  Finally, Congress should amend the removal
statute to expressly restrict the use of post-removal damage stipulations.
Congress enacted the diversity and removal statutes to protect out-of-state
parties from local prejudice, and it should take steps to ensure that its intent is
not undermined by recognizing post-removal damage stipulations.
Lower courts, state legislatures, and Congress have all had a hand in the
post-removal damage stipulation problem.  Acting in concert or solo, these
groups have the ability to ensure that plaintiffs do not use post-removal
damage stipulations as a device to manipulate diversity jurisdiction.
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